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Corporation, et al., 
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ROBERT F. TROISIO, as Liquidating Trustee of 
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 Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
EDWARD L. ERICKSON; BYRON HEWETT; LEON 
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TALLETT; J. WILLIAM FREYTAG; ZOLA P. 
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JONATHAN COOL; ALLEN J. LAUER 
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for the District of Delaware 
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____________ 
  
O P I N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware had the 
authority to transfer an adversary proceeding to the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 
U.S.C. § 1631. While the issue as presented would have us 
determine whether the Bankruptcy Court is a “court” under 
28 U.S.C. § 610, we adopt a different rationale in upholding 
the orders of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court. 
Because the Bankruptcy Court lacked power to adjudicate the 
adversary proceeding brought by the trustee, its transfer of the 
adversary proceeding would have been ultra vires. Thus, the 
Bankruptcy Court correctly denied the motion to transfer the 
adversary proceeding.  
I.  
 In 2008, IMMC Corporation filed a petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Delaware. Appellant was appointed 
as the liquidating trustee under the plan of liquidation 
approved by the Court. In 2010, the trustee filed an adversary 
proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, alleging that Appellees, 
IMMC’s former officers and directors, had breached their 
fiduciary duties by pursuing a risky and costly litigation 
strategy in an unrelated suit against a competitor, 
overcompensating themselves in the process. 
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 In December 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted in the adversary 
proceeding. See Troisio v. Erickson (In re IMMC Corp.), Ch. 
11 Case No. 08-11178 (KJC), Adv. No. 10-53063-KJC, 2011 
WL 6832900 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 29, 2011). The Court 
rejected the notion that the adversary proceeding was a “core” 
proceeding. Id. at *2-4.  It also rejected the trustee’s argument 
that the adversary proceeding was a non-core proceeding 
“related to” a Chapter 11 case because the claims in the 
adversary proceeding lacked a “close nexus” to the Chapter 
11 plan. Id. at *2, *4; see Resorts Int’l, Inc. Litig. Tr.  v. Price 
Waterhouse (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 372 F.3d 154, 168-69 
(3d Cir. 2004) (after plan confirmation, a bankruptcy court’s 
“related to” jurisdiction is limited to matters in which “there 
is a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or a proceeding, as 
when a matter affects the interpretation, implementation, 
consummation, execution, or administration of a confirmed 
plan or incorporated litigation trust agreement”). The trustee 
did not appeal that ruling.  
 
After briefing and a separate hearing, the Bankruptcy 
Court considered the trustee’s request that the Bankruptcy 
Court transfer the adversary proceeding to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 
28 U.S.C. § 1631, which provides:   
 
Whenever a civil action is filed in 
a court as defined in section 610 
of this title or an appeal, including 
a petition for review of 
administrative action, is noticed 
for or filed with such a court and 
that court finds that there is a 
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want of jurisdiction, the court 
shall, if it is in the interest of 
justice, transfer such action or 
appeal to any other such court in 
which the action or appeal could 
have been brought at the time it 
was filed or noticed, and the 
action or appeal shall proceed as 
if it had been filed in or noticed 
for the court to which it is 
transferred on the date upon 
which it was actually filed in or 
noticed for the court from which it 
is transferred.  
According to 28 U.S.C. § 610:  
As used in this chapter the word 
“courts” includes the courts of 
appeals and district courts of the 
United States, the United States 
District Court for the District of 
the Canal Zone, the District Court 
of Guam, the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, the United States 
Court of Federal Claims, and the 
Court of International Trade.  
The trustee urged that the legislative history of both 
statutes evidenced Congressional intent to authorize 
bankruptcy courts to transfer proceedings under § 1631. 
Section 1631’s legislative history states that the statute was 
“broadly drafted to permit transfer between any two federal 
courts.” S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 11 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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And § 610 was amended in 1978 to explicitly include 
bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 610 “Historical and 
Statutory Notes,” referencing Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2665. 
Congress rescinded the 1978 Amendment when it enacted 
sweeping changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, thus 
deleting the reference to bankruptcy courts. But, it 
simultaneously amended the Code to provide that bankruptcy 
judges “shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known 
as the bankruptcy court for that district.” Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 151). The 
trustee contended that Congress removed bankruptcy courts 
from § 610 because, after the 1984 changes designating 
bankruptcy courts as “units” of the district courts, it would 
have been redundant to include both bankruptcy and district 
courts in the language of § 610.  
 
 The Bankruptcy Court denied the trustee’s motion to 
transfer. Troisio v. Erickson (In re IMMC Liquidating Estate), 
Bankr. No. 08-11178 (KJC), 2012 WL 523632 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Feb. 14, 2012).  Its reasoning was simple: 28 U.S.C. § 
1631 refers to “court[s] as defined in section 610,” and the 
definition of courts in 28 U.S.C. § 610 does not include 
bankruptcy courts. In re IMMC Liquidating Estate, 2012 WL 
523632, at *2. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned, it 
lacked authority to transfer the adversary proceeding under § 
1631. Id. It concluded that the plain text of § 1631, which 
referred only to “courts as defined in section 610,” controlled. 
28 U.S.C. § 1631. Moreover, its view of the legislative 
history was quite different from that of the trustee. Namely, it 
opined that Congress’s decision to remove bankruptcy courts 
from § 610 was an intentional withdrawal of bankruptcy 
courts’ transfer power. In re IMMC Liquidating Estate, 2012 
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WL 523632, at *2. The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed as 
dicta language in a footnote of a prior Third Circuit opinion, 
which suggested that bankruptcy courts could transfer actions 
under § 1631. Id.; see Geruschat v. Ernst Young LLP (In re 
Seven Fields Dev. Corp.), 505 F.3d 237, 247 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“[W]e take note of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 which provides 
that when a civil action is filed with a district court (of which 
the bankruptcy court is a unit) with a want of jurisdiction the 
court shall in the interest of justice transfer the case to a court 
in which it could have been filed originally.”).  
 
 Although the Bankruptcy Court denied the trustee’s 
motion to transfer, it allowed him to file a motion to withdraw 
the reference in the District Court, which clearly fell within § 
610’s definition of courts, so that it could consider a motion 
to transfer the adversary proceeding under § 1631. In re 
IMMC Liquidating Estate, 2012 WL 523632, at *4. However, 
the District Court denied the motion. Troisio v. Erickson (In 
re IMMC Corp.), Civ. No. 12-406-GMS (D. Del. Feb. 9, 
2015), ECO N. 11. The District Court reasoned that, because 
the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over the adversary 
proceeding, the action was never properly referred to the 
Bankruptcy Court, and the District Court could not withdraw 
the reference of a proceeding that was never referred. See Id. 
at 2-3 (“[T]he district court may withdraw in whole or in part, 
any case or proceeding referred under this section[.]” 
(emphasis added by District Court) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 
157(d))).1 
 
 The trustee then renewed its motion in the Bankruptcy 
Court to transfer the adversary proceeding to the Eastern 
                                              
1 This order has not been appealed.  
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District of Pennsylvania under § 1631. Troisio v. Erickson (In 
re IMMC Corp.), Bankr. No. 08-11178 (KJC), 2015 WL 
6684638 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 30, 2015). The Bankruptcy 
Court denied the renewed motion, which it treated as a 
motion for reconsideration, because the trustee failed to 
identify an intervening change in the law and the Court 
remained “convinced that the express language and legislative 
history of § 610 supports the proposition that Congress did 
not intend to include bankruptcy courts in the definition of 
‘courts.’” Id., at *2; see N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (a 
motion to reconsider must rely on one of three things: “(1) an 
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of 
new evidence . . . ; [or] (3) the need to correct a clear error [of 
law] or prevent manifest injustice” (citation omitted) 
(alterations in original)).  
 
 The trustee filed a notice of appeal of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s 2012 order denying the original motion to transfer 
and its 2015 order denying the renewed motion to transfer.2 
The District Court affirmed both orders, relying on the same 
                                              
2 The trustee also filed a motion seeking certification of the 
appeal directly to the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d)(2)(A). The District Court certified the issue for direct 
appeal, but the trustee failed to perfect the appeal to the Third 
Circuit by filing a petition for permission with the circuit 
clerk as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
8006(g). The trustee then filed a motion to reopen and 
proceed with the appeal before the District Court. The District 
Court granted the motion to reopen, and the appeal proceeded 
before the District Court.  
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reasoning: bankruptcy courts are not “courts” according to the 
plain language of § 610. Like the Bankruptcy Court, the 
District Court concluded that neither legislative history nor 
binding Third Circuit precedent supported the trustee’s 
position. See Troisio v. Erickson (In re IMMC Corp.), Civ. 
No. 15-1043 (GMS), 2018 WL 259941 (D. Del. Jan. 2, 2018). 
This appeal followed. 
 
II.3 
 The trustee’s primary argument on appeal is that 
because we reasoned in In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, 542 
F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2008), that bankruptcy courts are “units” of 
district courts, they therefore fall under § 610’s definition of 
“courts.” Thus, he argues, the Bankruptcy Court had authority 
to transfer the adversary proceeding under § 1631. While the 
Bankruptcy Court may be a “unit” of the district court, § 610 
lists district courts, not units of that court, and does not list 
bankruptcy courts.4 But, because in Schaefer Salt, we ignored 
the absence of bankruptcy courts from the definition of § 451 
so as to equate district courts and “units,” we begin with a 
discussion of that case.  
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d). Because this appeal concerns a pure question of law, 
we review the District Court’s order de novo. See Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 584 (1988) (“[I]ssues of law are 
reviewed de novo . . . .”).  
4 For this reason, Judge Roth believes that § 1631 by its plain 
terms does not grant transfer authority to bankruptcy courts 
because § 610, which defines the word “court” for purposes 
of § 1631, does not explicitly list bankruptcy courts.  
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Schaefer Salt filed several bankruptcy petitions in an 
attempt to use bankruptcy proceedings to avoid tax lien 
foreclosure actions brought against it in state court. Schaefer 
Salt, 542 F.3d at 94. The bankruptcy court dismissed the 
bankruptcy petitions as having been filed in bad faith and 
awarded attorney fees and costs against Schaefer Salt’s 
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, citing “vexatious litigation . 
. . designed [to] . . . unreasonably multiply litigation that has 
resulted not only in the consumption of Bankruptcy Court 
resources but a back and forth in the State Court.” Id. at 95.5  
 
On appeal, we considered whether the bankruptcy 
court had the power to impose sanctions under § 1927. Id. at 
102. We first noted that courts were split on this issue. Id. The 
historical and statutory notes to § 1927 referred to the 
definition of “court of the United States” in 28 U.S.C. § 451. 
Id. at 103. According to § 451,  
 
The term “court of the United 
States” includes the Supreme 
Court of the United States, courts 
of appeals, district courts 
constituted by chapter 5 of [Title 
28], including the Court of 
International Trade and any court 
created by Act of Congress the 
                                              
5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “Any attorney . . . who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally 
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct.”  
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judges of which are entitled to 
hold office during good behavior. 
Because § 451’s definition of “court of the United States” did 
not include bankruptcy courts, some courts had held that 
bankruptcy courts lacked authority to issue sanctions under § 
1927. Id. The express language of § 451 notwithstanding, 
other courts had concluded that a bankruptcy court “is within 
the definition of § 451 because of its status as a unit of the 
district court, with the district court clearly being a ‘court of 
the United States.’” Id. (citing, e.g., Volpert v. Ellis (In re 
Volpert), 177 B.R. 81, 88–89 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), aff'd, 
186 B.R. 240 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 110 
F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1997)). See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (“In each 
judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in active services shall 
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the 
bankruptcy court for that district.”). We then answered the 
question ourselves:  
 
We find that although a 
bankruptcy court is not a “court of 
the United States” within the 
meaning of § 451, it is a unit of 
the district court, which is a 
“court of the United States,” and 
thus the bankruptcy court comes 
within the scope of § 451. Under 
28 U.S.C. § 157 and the Standing 
Order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New 
Jersey, which delegate authority 
to the bankruptcy courts in the 
District of New Jersey to hear 
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Title 11 cases as well as “any and 
all proceedings” necessary to hear 
and decide those cases, the 
Bankruptcy Court had the 
authority to impose sanctions . . .  
under § 1927. 
Id. at 105.   
Thus, the trustee urges, our precedent has concluded 
that “bankruptcy courts, as units of the district court, come 
within the definition of ‘courts’ in 28 U.S.C. § 451 and 
therefore have the authority to impose sanctions under [§ 
1927].” Br. for Appellant at 9. Because § 451 closely mirrors 
§ 610, he argues that the Bankruptcy Court also comes within 
§ 610’s definition of “courts” and therefore the Court had 
authority to transfer the adversary proceeding under § 1631. 
However, he overlooks a key distinction between the issue in 
Schaefer Salt and the issue before us. In Schaefer Salt there 
was no question that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction 
over Schaefer Salt’s bankruptcy petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 
157 and the matter before the Court was clearly encompassed 
within the standing order of reference entered by the District 
Court. See Schaefer Salt, 542 F.3d at 105. This included the 
authority to hear proceedings necessary to adjudicate the 
bankruptcy petitions, including proceedings to impose 
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. Thus, Schaefer Salt’s 
statement that a bankruptcy court is a “unit” of the district 
court does not address the court’s authority to act under 28 
U.S.C. § 157, or, for that matter, the Constitution.  
 
 Here, the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction and 
authority to act are implicated, as the Bankruptcy Court ruled 
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that it lacked jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding and 
the District Court concluded that the matter had never been 
referred to the Bankruptcy Court. “Congress has vested 
‘limited authority’ in bankruptcy courts.” Resorts Int’l, 372 
F.3d at 161 (quoting Bd. of Governors v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 
502 U.S. 32, 40 (1991)). They may exercise only the 
authority conferred to them by statute. Resorts Int’l, F.3d at 
161 (“[T]he source of the bankruptcy court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the express 
terms of the Plan. The source of the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157.” (quoting United 
States Brass Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Group, Inc. (In re United 
States Brass Corp.), 301 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2002))). 
Because the delegation of judicial authority to non-Article III 
tribunals has Constitutional implications, we must “jealously 
guard[]” the parameters of that authority. Northern Pipeline 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982).   
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), federal district court 
judges have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases 
under title 11.” District court judges may refer some of these 
matters to bankruptcy judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (“Each 
district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 
and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in 
or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the 
bankruptcy judges for the district.”). Section 157 “divid[es] 
all matters that may be referred to the bankruptcy court into 
two categories: ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ proceedings.” Exec. 
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 
(2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157). Core proceedings are matters 
which “invoke a substantive right provided by title 11” or 
“that by [their] nature could arise only in the context of a 
bankruptcy case.” Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 836 (3d 
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Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotiation marks omitted).  
Non-core proceedings are “not . . . core” but are “otherwise 
related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). Since 
the adversary proceeding was neither core nor related to the 
Chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear it.  
 
  Thus, the trustee’s reliance on Schaefer Salt is 
misplaced. The Bankruptcy Court here lacked authority over 
the claims in the adversary proceeding. Exercising 
jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding so as to transfer it 
under §1631 would have been ultra vires, regardless of 
whether bankruptcy courts fall under § 610’s definition of 
courts. Cognizant of bankruptcy courts’ limited authority and 
our obligation to guard the limits of that authority, we cannot 
approve of the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction to 
transfer the adversary proceeding under these circumstances. 
 
As he did before the Bankruptcy and District Courts, 
the trustee argues that § 1631 was “broadly drafted to permit 
transfer between any two federal courts.” S. Rep. No. 97-275, 
at 11. However, given the nature of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court that lacks jurisdiction over a 
proceeding cannot transfer that proceeding under § 1631.  
And, even assuming that Congress intended bankruptcy 
courts to fall under § 610’s definition of courts by virtue of 
their status as units of the district courts, the trustee cannot 
overcome the Bankruptcy Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the 
claims in the adversary proceeding in this case. Nor are we 
bound by the language in Seven Fields suggesting that a 
bankruptcy court that lacked jurisdiction over a proceeding 
could transfer it under § 1631. “[W]e are not bound by our 
Court’s prior dicta,” Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 
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F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007), and the suggestion of an 
alternative basis for our ruling in a footnote in that opinion 
was clearly dicta. 
 
While the purpose of § 1631 is to remedy a lack of 
jurisdiction, we read § 1631 as intending to permit transfer to 
remedy a lack of statutory jurisdiction only. Statutory 
jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332, is distinct from constitutional jurisdiction, a tribunal’s 
authority under the Constitution to hear a matter. See Mayor 
v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 252 (1868) (in order to hear a matter, 
a court must have jurisdiction under both the Constitution and 
a statute). On the heels of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Northern Pipeline, Congress enacted laws to establish a 
constitutional scheme whereby the power over bankruptcy 
matters was lodged in the district courts, with their having the 
ability to refer matters to bankruptcy judges. See Northern 
Pipeline 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional 
Congress’s broad grant of authority to bankruptcy courts). 
Whether or not they established bankruptcy “courts” may be 
unclear, but what is clear is that the Bankruptcy Court’s 
power to deal with all matters pertaining to bankruptcy, as a 
constitutional matter, emanates from the District Court. Here, 
the District Court specifically ruled that, in light of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s ruling that the matter was neither a core 
proceeding nor one “related to” the Chapter 11 petition, it 
made no reference regarding this proceeding. Since it was 
never referred by the District Court, the Bankruptcy Court 
had no constitutional authority over the matter in light of 
Northern Pipeline. Transfer under § 1631 simply cannot cure 
this lack of constitutional jurisdiction.  
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Finally, we note that several of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure authorize bankruptcy courts to transfer 
various bankruptcy matters. For example, Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 7087, which expressly incorporates 28 
U.S.C. § 1412, allows a bankruptcy court to transfer a “case 
or proceeding under title 11 to a district court for another 
district, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the 
parties.” Our holding today does not call into question the 
validity of transfer under Rule 7087 because bankruptcy 
courts have statutory authority over “cases under title 11 and 
any or all proceedings arising under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 
157(a). Nor does it cast doubt upon the transfer of a 
bankruptcy petition to cure a defect in venue under Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1014, as bankruptcy courts 
have statutory authority over bankruptcy petitions under 28 
U.S.C. § 157. Our holding today simply reaffirms the well-
established rule that bankruptcy courts may exercise only the 
authority delegated to them by statute and referred to them by 
the standing order of the district court. Because the adversary 
proceeding in this case fell outside the Bankruptcy Court’s 
jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Court properly declined to 
transfer the proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.  
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the order of the 
District Court.  
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